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I. INTRODUCTION
Children are frequently victims of sexual abuse,' yet courts
often find it difficult to convict the person the child claims is
responsible. Court surroundings intimidate children, often mak-
ing them poor witnesses. In trying to elicit a complete statement
from a child, a prosecutor may appear to put words and ideas
into the child's mouth. As a result, a child's out-of-court state-
ment may be more complete and descriptive than the one made
in court. In addition, the child may be too young to testify, so
that her account can only be offered into evidence through
hearsay.2
In response to the problem, the Washington Legislature cre-
ated a new hearsay exception.8 That Act permits admission of a
1. The following number of child sexual assault victims were treated at the Sexual
Assault Center at Harborview Hospital in 1980:
0-4 years old, 127
5-8 years old, 172
9-12 years old, 155
13-16 years old, 275
SEXUAL ASSAULT CENTER, HARBORVIEW HosPrrAL, SEATTLE, WASH., CLIENT CHARACTERIS-
TICS 5 (1980).
2. See generally Stafford, The Child as a Witness, 37 WASH. L. Rav. 303 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Stafford]; Comment, Youth as a Bar to Testimonial Competency, 8
ARK. L. REV. 106 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Testimonial Bar].
3. WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1982). The Act provides: A statement made
by a child when under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact performed with
or on the child by another, not otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, is admissi-
ble in evidence in criminal proceedings in the courts of the state of Washington if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the
jury, that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide suffi-
cient indicia of reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) is unavailable as a witness; provided, that when the child is unavaila-
ble as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative
evidence of the act.
A statement may not be admitted under this section unless the proponent of the
statement makes known to the adverse party his intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of the statement sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to provide the
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hearsay statement about sexual abuse by a child under the age
of ten upon a finding by the court that the circumstances and
content of the statement indicate that it is sufficiently reliable to
be admitted into evidence. If the child is unavailable as a wit-
ness, the Act requires corroboration of the criminal act as well.
Whenever this new exception is invoked, the party against
whom the statement will be used must receive notice of the
intent to use the statement sufficiently in advance so that there
is adequate time to prepare a defense.
The Act fails to define unavailability, and in doing so, it
condones the admission of hearsay by children who are too
young to testify. Admission of this type of hearsay directly con-
flicts with the principles underlying the established hearsay
exceptions and the confrontation clause.4 Reliability is the pri-
mary consideration in determining whether to admit hearsay.
Washington courts admit hearsay of incompetent child declar-
ants under very limited circumstances. The Act expands the
degree to which this type of hearsay can be used to a point
where it is no longer consistent with the principles underlying
traditional hearsay exceptions. As a result, the Act is poor law,
since it violates the principles basic to all hearsay exceptions,
and is unconstitutional, since it fails to meet the standards
required by the confrontation clause.
This Comment will first analyze the Act in the light of the
principles that form the basis for the hearsay rule and its excep-
tions. It will then examine the effect of the Act on the preexist-
ing hearsay rules. Next, it will compare the concept of unavaila-
bility as used in the hearsay exceptions with the concept of
incompetence; both concepts are then analyzed according to the
requirements of the hearsay rules and the confrontation clause.
The Comment will conclude that the Act is unconstitutional
because it permits admission of hearsay of testimonially incom-
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.
4. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation clause applies to the states through the fourteenth
amendment).
The Act also violates the Washington Constitution's confrontation clause which
gives the accused the right to confront his accuser "face to face." WASH. CONST. art. I, §
22.1. The analysis in this Comment, however, focuses on the confrontation clause of the
United States Constitution, because the Washington Supreme Court follows the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal confrontation clause. See infra notes 61-63
and accompanying text.
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petent children.
II. THE AVAILABLE DECLARANT
"'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evi-
dence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."' Courts gener-
ally exclude hearsay because it is considered less reliable than
testimony by a person with firsthand knowledge of the facts.'
When a child tells an adult that someone sexually abused him or
her, and that statement is offered to prove the truth of the
child's assertion, the statement is hearsay.
When a declarant's out-of-court statement is allowed into
evidence, the court is denied the opportunity to see the declara-
tion tested under cross-examination. The trier of fact has noth-
ing against which to measure the value of the evidence. Some
kinds of hearsay, however, are considered so reliable that they
are admissible as substantive evidence. In each case, some spe-
cial necessity must exist for admitting the hearsay.7 Usually, this
is because the declarant is either unavailable, or the hearsay by
its nature is thought to be as reliable as the in-court statement.8
In addition, something either in the content or the circum-
stances surrounding the statement must demonstrate that it is
particularly reliable.' For example, present sense impressions are
considered trustworthy because the contemporaneity of the
event and declaration negate the likelihood of deliberate or con-
scious misrepresentation.1o Similarly, dying declarations regard-
ing the cause of death are admissible because the fear of death is
considered to make the declarant's statement trustworthy." The
5. FzD. R. EVID. 801; WASH. R. EVID. 801. "Hearsay is not admissible except as pro-
vided by these rules or other rules.. . ." FED. R. EvD. 802; WASH. R. EvD. 802.
6. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 800-9 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as J. WEINSTEIN]. The presence of the witness in court under oath solemnifies the
occasion; the jury can observe the witness and the defendant can cross-examine. Thethree together result in an expectation that the witness will tell the truth. Without those
three conditions present, testimony may be unreliable "because faults in perception,
memory, and narration of the declarant will not be exposed." Id. at 800-11.
7. 5 J. WIGMORE, EvIENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1420 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as J. WIGMORE].
8. Id.
9. FEn. R. Ev. 803, Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules at 240 (1982).10. "Moreover, if the witness is the declarant, he may be examined on the state-ment. If the witness is not the declarant he may be examined as to circumstances as an
aid in evaluating the statement." Id. at 241.
11. FED. R. Evm. 804, Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules at 254
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declarant's death supplies the element of necessity. Without
these safeguards, there is no justification for dispensing with the
requirement that the declarant testify in court subject to cross-
examination.
The Federal Rules of Evidence codified the requirements of
necessity and trustworthiness in the two residual exceptions. 2
These exceptions allow hearsay not falling within an established
exception to come into evidence if: 1) it has circumstantial guar-
antees of trustworthiness equivalent to those found in the codi-
fied exceptions; 2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; 3)
it is more probative than other evidence which might be offered;
and 4) its admission serves the interests of both justice and the
rules. "' Although Washington did not include the residual excep-
tions when it adopted the Federal Rules,' 4 these principles are
inherent in all of the adopted exceptions.'
5
The Act must thus be examined in relation to these hearsay
principles to determine whether it provides sufficient safeguards
to warrant the admission of hearsay. The Act has a twofold
(1982).
12. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts;
and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best
be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement
may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name
and address of the declarant.
FED. R. Evw. 803(24), 804(b)(5). The Advisory Committee noted that the purpose of the
residual exceptions is to encourage growth in development of hearsay exceptions while
embodying the principles underlying the exceptions. FED. R. EvD. art. VIII, Notes of
Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules, Introductory Note at 232 (1982).
13. FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
14. 5 K. TEGLA4D, WASHiNGTON PAnczca VIII (1982). Although Washington did not
adopt the residual exceptions, it was not rejection of the underlying principles that
prompted the caution but rather a concern about uniform application of the hearsay
rules generally. Washington did not adopt FED. Evm. RULE 803(24) for fear that "trial
judges would differ greatly in applying the elastic standard of equivalent trustworthiness.
The result would be a lack of uniformity which would make preparation for trial diffi-
cult." WASH. R. Evm. 803 comment at 222 (1982). The comment notes that rule 102
permits flexibility in the construction of the rules which allows for growth and develop-
ment. Id.
15. "In these principles [necessity and a higher than usual degree of trustworthi-
ness] is contained whatever of reason underlies the exceptions." 5 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 7, § 1423, at 254-55.
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effect on the admission of evidence: first, it expands upon
existing evidence rules by admitting prior consistent statements
of witnesses as substantive evidence and by admitting prior
inconsistent statements not made under oath as substantive;
second, the Act admits the statements of incompetent
declarants.
A court may admit as nonhearsay prior consistent state-
ments of a witness only to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or
improper motive or influence.1 The Act enlarges upon this rule
by permitting admission of prior consistent statements in the
state's case-in-chief. This use makes the statement hearsay; con-
sequently, it must meet the criteria for a hearsay exception in
that it must be necessary and have circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness. The necessity for a child victim's hearsay arises
from the difficulty the prosecution encounters in eliciting com-
plete and credible testimony from a child witness. Further
necessity may arise because the hearsay is more probative than
other evidence of the crime. The Act requires that the court find
indicia of reliability based on the time, content and circum-
stances of the declaration prior to its admission.17 This appears
to meet the trustworthiness requirement basic to all hearsay
exceptions. Furthermore, in this instance, the child is a witness.
The trier of fact has the opportunity to observe the child
firsthand, and the opponent may cross-examine the declarant
about the circumstances under which he made the statement.
16. WASH. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(i).
17. WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.44.120(1) (Supp. 1982). In testimony on the Act before a
joint hearing of the Senate Judiciary and the House Ethics, Law and Justice Committees
on January 28, 1982, Mary Kay Barbieri of the King County Prosecutor's Office sug-
gested several indicia of reliability that a court might consider when determining the
trustworthiness of a child's hearsay statement. Hearings on S. 4461 Before the JointComm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm. and the House Ethics, Law and Justice Comm.,
47th Leg., Reg. Sess. 7-14 (1982) (testimony of Mary Kay Barbieri, Chief of the Crim.Div., King County Prosecutor's Office, Seattle, Wash.) [hereinafter cited as Barbieri].
She suggested that the courts, in determining trustworthiness, examine the contents of
the statement and language used by the child, note when the statement was made, and
consider the circumstances surrounding the statement. Id. This analysis appears to per-
mit indicia of reliability to replace competency of the hearsay declarant as a basis for
admission of the hearsay. Although the evidence rules do not explicitly require that ahearsay declarant be competent, the Advisory Committee stated that "(in a hearsay
situation, the declarant is of course a witness ... ." FED. R. Evm. 803, Notes of Advisory
Committee on Proposed Rules at 240 (1982). Furthermore, some commentators have
expressed the opinion that all hearsay statements introduced under any exception to the
rule should be made by someone competent as a witness at the time the statement was
made. Stafford, supra note 2, at 307; Testimonial Bar, supra note 2, at 106.
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The Act also expands the use of a witness's inconsistent
statements. Washington Evidence Rules admit prior inconsistent
statements of a witness only if made under oath subject to cross-
examination."8 The Act, however, permits admission of prior
inconsistent statements even if not made under oath. The Act
still requires indicia of reliability before the statement can be
admitted, but the reliability need not be limited to the under
oath requirement. The same necessity exists as with the prior
consistent statement, and there is the same opportunity to
observe and cross-examine the witness.
III. THE UNAVAILABLE DECLARANT
The Act expands the existing hearsay structure and under-
mines basic hearsay principles by admitting hearsay of incompe-
tent children. The Act's failure to define unavailability leaves
open the possibility that a child may be unavailable to testify
because of incompetence. The Act apparently allows indicia of
reliability and corroboration to rehabilitate the statement of a
child too untrustworthy to testify in open court. Since trustwor-
thiness is a basic requirement for any hearsay exception, this
application of the Act puts it in direct conflict with existing
exceptions.
The Act requires corroboration of the abuse-an explicit
recognition that more than indicia of reliability is necessary to
provide guarantees of trustworthiness when the declarant is
unavailable. To the extent that it allows the hearsay declaration
of an unavailable declarant, the Act falls within the ambit of
Rule 804.1' Rule 803 admits hearsay regardless of declarant
18. Washington Evidence rules do not consider that prior inconsistent statements,
made under oath and subject to perjury penalties, constitute hearsay. WASH. R. Evm.
801(d)(1)(A).
19. Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable.
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a wit-
ness" includes situations in which the declarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of
privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of his
statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject
matter of his statement despite an order of the court to do so;
or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter on
his statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing
because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or
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availability20 because the circumstances surrounding the declara-
tion lend the required guarantees of trustworthiness."1 Recogniz-
ing that some hearsay is less reliable,"' however, Rule 804 allows
its admission only if the declarant is unavailable. 3 Rule 804
carefully circumscribes the type of admissible hearsay: 4 it per-
mits its admission only if the declarant is unavailable and limits
unavailability to specific circumstances. The Act, though, admits
any hearsay deemed reliable by the court," thus creating a
broad exception where there previously existed only a very nar-
row one.
A witness is unavailable with respect to Rule 804 if he is
dead,'6 not subject to process,'27 or privileged not to testify.'6 A
witness is also unavailable if he claims lack of memory or if he is
unable to testify because of an existing physical or mental illness
or infirmity.'9 Each category of unavailability is based upon an
underlying assumption that the declarant could have been a wit-
ness but for the reasons creating the unavailability. 0 In describ-
infirmity: or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his
statement has been unable to procure his attendance (or in
the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3),
or (4), his attendance or testimony) by process or other rea-
sonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of
lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing
of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness
from attending or testifying.
FED. R. Evw. 804(a)(1)-(5); WASH. R. EVID. 804(a)(1)-(5).
20. WASH. R. EVID. 803.
21. See supra text accompanying note 10.
22. FED. R. EVID. 804, Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules at 253
(1982).
23. WASH. R. EvID. 804.
24. WASH. R. EvID. 804(b)(1)-(5).
25. WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.44.120(2)(b) (Supp. 1982).
26. WASH. R. EVID. 804(a)(4).
27. WASH. R. EvID. 804(a)(5).
28. WASH. R. EVID. 804(a)(1).
29. WASH. R. EVID. 804(3),(4).
30. WASH. R. EVID. 804(a)(1) requires that a witness be testimonially competent,
since one cannot raise a privilege unless already a witness. To be a witness, one must be
competent. WASH. R. Evm. 804(a)(2) is based on the fact that the witness is actually on
the stand but refuses to answer specific questions, thus implying competency. WASH. R.
Evm. 804(a)(3) is also based on the proposition that the witness is present on the stand
but is unable to remember the subject matter of prior statements. That witness too must
be competent prior to becoming "unavailable." According to WASH. R. Evw. 804(a)(4),
unavailability due to death or then existing mental or physical infirmity implies that at
the time of the prior statement the witness was competent but is now unavailable to
1984] 393
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ing unavailability, Dean Wigmore asserts that "[i]f the declarant
would have been disqualified to take the stand by reason of
infancy. . ., his extra-judicial declaration must also be inadmis-
sible."3 ' Wigmore also observes that admission of hearsay under
an exception presupposes that the declarant possessed the quali-
fications of a witness.2 He noted that ". . . these extra judicial
statements may be inadmissible because of their failure to fulfill
the ordinary rules about qualifications, even though they may
meet the requirements of a hearsay exception."" The Federal
Advisory Committee Notes seem to agree by explicitly providing
that a hearsay declarant must be a witness.34
In addition to carefully defining unavailability, Rule 804
also limits the type of hearsay admissible when a declarant is
unavailable. For example, a dying declaration,' former testi-
mony, 6 and statements against interest 3 l can only be admitted
when the declarant is unavailable as defined by the rule.
Although the statements gain credibility by the surrounding cir-
cumstances, the guarantees of trustworthiness are not as strong
as in the Rule 803 exceptions. Declarant availability is still a rel-
evant factor. The reliability of the statements stems, at least in
part, from the fact that the declarant must have been compe-
tent. The Act attempts to infuse the incompetent child's state-
ment with reliability by requiring corroboration of the abuse.
The problem, however, is that corroboration of the abuse may
have little to do with the truly incriminating aspects of the
testify because dead or temporarily incompetent or unable to withstand the rigors of
testimony. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1406, at 219. Finally, WASH. R. EvwD.
804(a)(5) presumes that if the state could compel attendance by process, the witness
would be able to testify. Thus, in each instance the person must be competent to be a
witness prior to the situation creating the unavailability.
31. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1445, at 304 (1974). Wigmore distinguishes this
statement in another section by noting that in situations involving spontaneous exclama-
tions, a child's incompetence does not necessarily disqualify the declaration since "the
principle of the present exception obviates the usual sources of untrustworthiness." 6 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1751, at 223. Thus, only if the other requirements of the hear-
say provide the guarantee of trustworthiness might an incompetent child's spontaneous
exclamation be considered trustworthy.
32. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1423, at 255.
33. Id.
34. FED. R. EVID. 803, Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules at 240
(1982).
35. WASH. R. EvID. 804(b)(2).
36. WASH. R. EvID. 804(b)(1).
37. WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
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child's statement.38
The Washington legislature has carefully defined circum-
stances in which a child is incompetent to testify. " Before a
child can testify about an event, a court must determine whether
a child understands his obligation to tell the truth and whether
the child has the mental capacity to receive an accurate impres-
sion of the event. 0 Commentators also suggest that a child must
be able to retain an independent recollection of the event and to
express in his own words his memory of the occurrence."' Gener-
ally there is agreement that intelligence rather than age is the
proper criterion for determining competency.42
While courts have been solicitous of the problems of the
38. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
39. "The following persons shall not be competent to testify:
(2) Children under ten years of age who appear incapable of receiving just impres-
sions of the facts, respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly." WASH.
REv. CODE § 5.60.050(2) (1981).
The same rule applies in criminal cases. WASH. CR. R. 6.12(c)(2). WASH. REV. CODE §
5.60.050 does not impose a lower age limit with regard to child competency.
The Statute codifies Washington case law with regard to child competency. A child
must be able to relate the facts truthfully. E.g., State v. Allen, 70 Wash. 2d 690, 692, 424
P.2d 1021, 1022 (1967); State v. Ridley, 61 Wash. 2d 457, 459, 378 P.2d 700, 702 (1963).
See also State v. Tate, 74 Wash. 2d 261, 266, 444 P.2d 150, 153 (1968). Historically,
courts have required not only that a child be able to relate the facts truthfully but also
that he or she have the capacity to appreciate the obligation of an oath, and the duty to
speak the truth. E.g., Ruocco v. Logiocco, 104 Conn. 585, 590, 134 A. 73, 75 (1926); Ball
v. State, 188 Tenn. 255, 258-59, 219 S.W.2d 166, 167 (1949); Kalberg v. Bon Marche, 64
Wash. 452, 453-4, 117 P. 227, 227 (1911). The judge may give instruction to the child on
the nature and obligation of the oath after which the child should be permitted to tes-
tify. See State v. Smith, 95 Wash. 271, 272, 163 P. 759, 759 (1917); Hodd v. City of
Tacoma, 45 Wash. 436, 88 P. 842 (1907). The oath was required, at least under WASH.
Rav. CODE § 9.01.111, since a child under eight cannot be convicted of perjury and thus
is not subject to punishment. Stafford, supra note 2, at 317. Stafford noted that while no
religious requirement is part of the understanding, the mode of administering an oath or
affirmation should be such as may be most consistent with and binding upon the con-
science of the person to whom such oath or affirmation is administered. There is a
requirement that the child promise to tell the truth. Id. at 319.
40. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.050(2)(1981). To be competent, children must have a
general capacity to receive "just impressions of the facts respecting which they are
examined, or of relating them truly." State v. Fairbanks, 25 Wash. 2d 686, 688, 171 P.2d
845, 846 (1946)(citing REM. REV. STAT. § 1213 (1922)). See also State v. Tate, 74 Wash.
2d 261, 444 P.2d 150 (1968)(7 /2 year-old could testify because she was capable of receiv-
ing correct impressions of the facts and was capable of relating them truly); Common-
wealth v. Tatisos, 238 Mass. 322, 326, 130 N.E. 495, 498 (1921).
41. E.g., Stafford, supra note 2, at 307.
42. Ball v. State, 188 Tenn. 255, 258-59, 219 S.W. 166, 167 (1949); State v. Smith, 95
Wash. 271, 273, 163 P. 759, 760 (1917); State v. Wilson, 1 Wash. App. 1001, 1003, 465
P.2d 413, 414 (1970). See also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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child as a witness,"s they have exhibited extreme reluctance to
admit hearsay by an incompetent child." The only exceptions
courts have made to the rule are in the limited cases of res ges-
tae. For example, in U.S. v. Nick," the Ninth Circuit admitted
hearsay of a small child under an excited utterance analysis,
consistent with and corroborated by a later statement to a phy-
sician. In State v. Beaudin," the court admitted hearsay of an
incompetent declarant, but only to prove that a complaint of
sexual abuse had occurred. The court refused to admit the con-
tent of the statement, recognizing that to do so would admit evi-
43. Cases involving indecent assaults on children have received special treatment by
a few courts. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 20 Wash. 2d 443, 445, 147 P.2d 940, 942
(1944)(leading question was permitted in case of sexual abuse where child was witness
since children are unaccustomed to court proceedings); see also Stafford, supra note 2, at
307. The courts admit hearsay statements of children tending to incriminate the defen-
dant. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 3 Wash. 2d 543, 552, 101 P.2d 298, 302 (1940)(hearsay
statement of 5 year-old witness was admitted since the court found the child competent
to testify and there was corroboration of all the hearsay testimony admitted.)
44. State v. Wilson, 156 Ohio St. 525, 103 N.E.2d 552 (1952) (lower court should not
have admitted the deposition of a child of tender years who had not been found compe-
tent to testify by a judge, even though the child was sworn and subject to cross-examina-
tion by defense counsel). See also State v. Segerberg, 131 Conn. 546, 547-48, 41 A.2d 101,
102 (1945)(an 8 year-old was found incompetent to testify regarding an indecent assault
and the court refused to admit her hearsay statements). Contra State v. Bloomstrom, 12
Wash. App. 416, 529 P.2d 1124 (1974). The Bloomstrom court admitted hearsay of an
incompetent declarant because the court had erroneously relied on State v. Canida, 4
Wash. App. 275, 480 P.2d 800 (1971). In Canida the declarants were found competent to
testify, whereas in the instant case the child was found incompetent. Id. at 276, 480 P.2d
at 801. It would therefore be improper to rely on Bloomstrom for the proposition that a
court will admit incompetent hearsay. See generally Annot., 30 A.L.R. 2d 771 (1953)(dis-
cussion on admissibility of children's depositions at trial).
45. 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979). The hearsay statement of a 3 year-old to a physi-
cian was admitted on the cause of injury where there was physical evidence corroborat-
ing the statement. The court also admitted the statements made by the child to his
mother under the excited utterance exception.
46. 76 Wash. 306, 136 P. 137 (1913). The court held that it was proper to admit the
hearsay statements of a 21/2 year-old child to the effect that the child had complained of
an assault, but it was error to repeat the statements made to the witness by the child. Id.
at 307, 136 P. at 137. "To do so was an indirect method of introducing evidence which
could not have been given by the child herself owing to her tender years; there being no
contention that the remarks made by the child were any part of the res gestae." Id. C.f.
Testimonial Bar, supra note 2. While courts have frequently admitted hearsay state-
ments under the res gestae exception or for the limited purpose of showing the condition
of the child at the time of the statement,
instances exist for which no basis for admission is apparent unless it would be
abhorrence of the crime involved. The better reasoned cases, however, require
that all hearsay statements introduced under any exception to the rule be
made by someone competent as a witness at the time the statement was made.
Id. at 106. Stafford cited the above quote and noted that the rule had not yet been
decided in Washington. Stafford, supra note 2, at 306.
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dence otherwise inadmissible.
Some confusion still exists with respect to whether compe-
tency at the time of the testimony, the event, or the declaration
is determinative of admissibility of the hearsay. Commentators
have observed, however, that "with the exception of res gestae
utterances, all hearsay statements introduced under any excep-
tion to the rule should be made by someone competent as a wit-
ness at the time the statement was made."' 7
In Huff v. White Motor Corp.," the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals considered the competency of an unavailable declar-
ant to determine the admissibility of his hearsay statement.49
Although the case involved an adult, the court's analysis of com-
petency of an unavailable declarant is instructive. The defense
had asked the court to admit a statement against pecuniary
interest made by the plaintiffs' decedent in a wrongful death
case. The declarant was in the hospital and had made state-
ments about the cause of his accident several days before he
died. After considering whether to admit those statements, the
Huff court held that the trial court should have made a prelimi-
nary determination regarding the competency of the declarant
at the time he made the declaration.50 The court arrived at this
conclusion by examining the policy requirements underlying the
hearsay exceptions and expressed in the residual exceptions."1 It
noted that for the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
to be valid, the declarant must have been mentally competent."s
The Act attempts to enhance the reliability of hearsay by
unavailable and potentially incompetent witnesses by requiring
that there be corroboration of the act.53 Corroboration, however,
does not insure trustworthiness." One has little to do with the
47. Stafford, supra note 2, at 307 (emphasis in original).
48. 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 294.
51. Id. at 293.
52. "He is a hearsay declarant, not a witness, and the circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness on which admissibility of the hearsay depends all presuppose the mental
capacity of a reasonable man in the position Huff was in. If that mental capacity was
lacking, so are the guarantees of trustworthiness." Id. at 294.
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120(2)(b) (Supp. 1982).
54. In testimony at a hearing on the Act, Ms. Barbieri suggested that gonorrhea of
the throat or another venereal disease would corroborate the child's hearsay; medical
trauma evidence might serve as corroboration; a child with no way of getting money,
appearing with money that he said he got for performing a sex act, might also corrobo-
rate the hearsay. See Barbieri, supra note 14, at 10. Some of the examples, however,
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other. The fact of sexual abuse does not corroborate statements
regarding who committed the abuse, the key testimony in most
cases. Without the declarant on the stand, the opponent is
denied the opportunity to test the recollection and truthfulness
of the hearsay. He is unable to test the possibility that, although
the abuse occurred, the child is covering up for one adult by
naming another, punishing someone for an undisclosed reason,
or too afraid to name the real abuser. The Act requires the
opponent to rely on a third person's rendition of a statement by
a person already found to be unable to not only distinguish
truth from falsehood, but also recognize the necessity to tell the
truth.
Admission of hearsay of testimonially incompetent children
undermines the general preference for first hand evidence.5 5 If a
child will make a poor witness, a prosecutor now has no incen-
tive to have him testify. In fact, the Act serves as a disincentive
to call the child to testify, since the child's statement will come
into evidence regardless of the child's availability. Furthermore,
a judge, sensitive to the plight of a young child on the witness
stand, may more readily find the child incompetent since such a
finding will not severely undermine the evidence. Thus, in the
interest of protecting the child, both the prosecution and the
court may relax their standards, resulting in more findings of
incompetency and a relaxation of the rule of preference for first
hand evidence in criminal cases. More importantly, such a trend
would have a devastating effect on the defendant's right to
confrontation.
IV. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The confrontation clause of the United States Constitution
bars the admission of hearsay by testimonially incompetent chil-
dren.' 6 The confrontation clause requires that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted
assume sexual abuse and put the child's statement in that context. For example, a child
may steal money and fear discipline. An interviewer who suspects abuse might uncon-
sciously suggest it to the child who then tells what he or she thinks the interviewer wants
to hear. Or a child may get a venereal disease from one adult but fear that person and
name another. If the child does not testify, the defense is limited in its ability to raise
these possibilities and cast doubt on the truthfulness of the hearsay.
55. Historically, the hearsay rule "evolved to ensure that the facts would be devel-
oped by persons having first hand knowledge." 4 J. WEINSTmN, supra note 6, at 800-9.
56. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
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with the witnesses against him. . . . "7 If a child declarant testi-
fies, there is no confrontation problem, since the defendant may
cross-examine the child concerning the hearsay. However, when
the child does not testify, cross-examination is impossible, and
confrontation clause problems arise. The presiding judge must
scrutinize the circumstances creating the absence along with the
guarantees of trustworthiness that surround the statement to
assure that the defendant's constitutional rights are protected."
Although the confrontation clause appears to completely
bar hearsay59 in criminal cases, the U. S. Supreme Court has
never insisted that physical presence of a witness and cross-
examination are indispensable to a fair trial.60 The Washington
confrontation clause, specifically requiring face-to-face confron-
tation,"' has not been construed as strictly as its language might
indicate it should.2 Instead, the Washington Supreme Court
recently adopted the analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court and
refused to analyze the confrontation issue under the Washington
Constitution.6
57. Id.
58. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
59. There is ongoing controversy whether the confrontation clause and hearsay
exceptions overlap completely. However, although they protect similar values and stem
from the same roots, their reach is not coextensive. The admission of hearsay "turns on
the due process considerations of fairness, reliability and trustworthiness." United States
v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309, 314 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977). Some believe
that the confrontation clause is a rule of preference requiring only that the court admit
the most reliable form of testimony in open court. Thus, if the witness is unavailable, the
confrontation clause is satisfied and statements satisfying a hearsay exception are admis-
sible. 4 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 800-20. Others believe the confrontation clause is
meant to protect the defendant from facing evidence that he cannot cross-examine effec-
tively, and that "the core right protected by the confrontation clause is satisfied when
the evidence admitted at trial was subject to cross-examination or was otherwise reliable,
and the absence of the witness was not procured by the government." Government of the
Canal Zone v. P. (Pinto), 590 F.2d 1344, 1352 (5th Cir. 1979)(footnote omitted).
60. 4 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 800-19.
61. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to . . . meet the witness against him face to face .. "
62. State v. Valladares, 99 Wash. 2d 663, 664 P.2d 508 (1983); State v. Parris, 98
Wash. 2d 140, 654 P.2d 77 (1982).
63. In State v. Parris, 98 Wash. 2d 140, 654 P.2d 77 (1982), an extrajudicial declar-
ant claimed a privilege and was thus unavailable to testify. The supreme court admitted
the hearsay despite the fact that the hearsay did not fall within a "firmly rooted" excep-
tion since it met the Roberts requirement of corroboration by circumstances clearly indi-
cating its trustworthiness. Id. at 152-53, 654 P.2d at 83-84. Justice Williams, in his dis-
sent, opined that the Roberts test must be read in the context of the rationales behind
the confrontation clause, allowing a balancing "when the amount of infringement on the
defendant's sixth amendment rights was minimal in comparison to the trustworthiness
of the statement." Id. at 167, 654 P.2d at 91 (Williams, J., dissenting). Williams noted
19841
400 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 7:387
Ohio v. Roberts,6' the most recent Supreme Court decision
that in sixth amendment cases, including Roberts, which admitted hearsay, there was
always an opportunity to cross-examine regarding the hearsay either at trial or pretrial
hearings. Id. at 167-68, 654 P.2d at 91. Using his analysis, the Act violates the sixth
amendment by virtue of the fact that the child declarant has never been subject to cross-
examination either prior to or at trial. It certainly violates the Washington confrontation
clause by denying the right to face-to-face confrontation.
Williams reiterated his confrontation clause analysis in his concurrence in State v.
Valladares, 99 Wash. 2d 663, 673, 664 P.2d 508, 514 (1983)(Williams, J., concurring). In
Valladares, the Washington Supreme Court admitted hearsay when a declarant was
unavailable under WASH. R. EVID. 804(a), since the declaration was against penal inter-
est. The court noted that the witness was unavailable despite a good faith effort to pro-
duce her. Id. at 668, 664 P.2d at 511. The court also found sufficient corroboration to
prove trustworthiness. Id. at 669, 664 P.2d at 511-12.
In Valladares, Williams reminded the court that Washington may interpret its con-
frontation clause more strictly than the parallel provision of the United States Constitu-
tion, especially where the language differs substantially. In his opinion the "face to face"
language in the Washington confrontation clause should provide greater protection than
both the sixth amendment and the hearsay rules. Id. at 674, 664 P.2d at 515 (Williams,
J., concurring). He suggested a balancing of state and defendant interests with added
weight placed on the defendant's side. Id. Nevertheless, he concurred in the defendant's
conviction because he believed that in that case the error was harmless. Id.
64. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). The Roberts Court found a witness unavailable after the
prosecution attempted to serve five subpoenas on the declarant and produced the declar-
ant's mother to testify that she did not know her daughter's whereabouts. The Court
noted that the prosecution did not breach its duty of a good faith effort to produce the
witness. Id. at 75-76. The dissent, however, strongly objected to the majority's finding of
good faith and opined that the prosecution should have made a much more thorough
investigation into the whereabouts of the declarant. Id. at 79-82.
Prior to Roberts, the Supreme Court analyzed the confrontation issue in a variety of
ways when a statement would have been admissible under a hearsay exception. In one
case the Court held that if the defense chose not to cross-examine, and there was evi-
dence corroborating the hearsay, admission of the hearsay did not violate the defen-
dant's right to confrontation. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). In another case,
the Supreme Court, finding a declarant unavailable due to lapse of memory while a wit-
ness, held that there was no violation of the confrontation clause as long as the hearsay
fell within the prior testimony hearsay exception. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970). However, in yet other cases, the Court found violations even when the witness
was available for cross-examination. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1973);
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
In Dutton v. Evans, the trial court admitted into evidence a statement made by a
coconspirator while he was in prison. Neither the prosecution nor the defense called the
declarant as a witness. There was overwhelming evidence against the defendant, includ-
ing eyewitness testimony corroborating the statement. The court noted the hearsay was
not "crucial" or "devastating" to the defendant's case. 400 U.S. at 87.
In California v. Green, the Court held that admission of out-of-court declarations
does not violate the confrontation clause when the declarant is present at trial and sub-
ject to cross-examination about his hearsay statements, and the statements were made
under oath and subject to cross-examination. 399 U.S. at 165-68.
In Green, the Court admitted the declarations when the witness, although on the
stand, became unavailable, because he testified he had no memory concerning either the
prior testimony or the event itself. The Court applied the same analysis to the confronta-
tion clause as to the prior testimony hearsay exception. The prior statement is consid-
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on the confrontation clause, enunciated a two part test to over-
come a confrontation clause challenge: 1) the prosecution must
demonstrate that the witness is unavailable after a good faith
effort to produce him; and 2) ,the hearsay must be marked with
sufficient indicia of reliability to fall within the policies of the
hearsay exceptions." The Court noted that reliability can be
inferred when the hearsay declaration falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception."' The Court concluded that in other
cases the evidence must be excluded absent "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness. "67
The Act fails to meet the Roberts requirement that the
prosecution make a good faith effort to produce the witness.
Inherent in that requirement is a produceable witness. Since an
incompetent child can never be a witness," the prosecution can-
not fulfill its obligation under Roberts. Even if the inability to
produce the child does not violate the good faith production
requirement, that requirement is undermined by the Act. Since
under the Act the hearsay is admissible even if the child does
not testify, there is little incentive for the prosecution to make
the good faith effort to produce the witness. And if the child is
likely to make a poor witness, there is an actual incentive to not
produce the child. If the court simply admits the hearsay of an
incompetent declarant because an incompetent is assumed to be
unavailable, the "good faith" requirement of Roberts becomes a
ered reliable because it was made under oath. It does not violate the confrontation clause
because it was subject to cross-examination when made. Id. at 165.
In Davis v. Alaska, the Court found a witness unavailable for purposes of confronta-
tion because Alaska state law precluded the defense from asking questions of a juvenile
on cross-examination that would tend to expose past convictions. Since the cross-exami-
nation would have exposed a possible bias on the part of a witness, the defense was
unable to fully and fairly cross-examine the witness. Consequently, the jury did not have
before it the complete defense theory nor did it have the ability to determine the accu-
racy and truthfulness of the witness, both key elements in the state's case. 415 U.S. at
317.
In Smith v. Illinois, the Court found a witness who refused to reveal his correct
name and address unavailable for confrontation purposes even though he was on the
witness stand available for cross-examination. The Court found the witness unavailable
notwithstanding the fact that the defendant did not give any reasons for his refusal. 390
U.S. at 134.
65. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
66. The Court suggested that cross-examined prior trial testimony and properly
administered business records exceptions "seem to be among the safest hearsay excep-
tions." Id. at 66 n.8.
67. Id. at 66.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
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nullity. The ultimate result is that where children are concerned,
the confrontation clause becomes a recitation of a hollow right.
The second part of the Roberts test requires "particular-
ized" guarantees of trustworthiness where the hearsay in ques-
tion is not a firmly rooted exception. 9 The Court thus requires a
higher standard as a substitute for the traditional hearsay
exception. The Act attempts to meet the higher standard by
requiring corroboration when the child is not a witness; corrobo-
ration not of the child's hearsay, but of the fact that the abuse
occurred.70 However, corroboration that abuse occurred does not
lend particular trustworthiness to the child's statement regard-
ing the identity of the abuser, usually a central issue at trial.
Consequently, the corroboration is of little value as a substitute
for the defendant's right and need to cross-examine the child
about his statement.
Some hearsay is particularly reliable, and cross-examina-
tion, while desirable, may be waived.7 1 However, under the Act,
a child's hearsay made weeks, months, or even years after the
abuse can come into evidence. Adult hearsay under similar cir-
cumstances is inadmissible. Time can have the same effect on a
child's memory and truthfulness as on an adult's. Corroboration
of the abuse adds no more to a child's hearsay than to an
adult's. If a competent declarant's hearsay is untrustworthy and
violates the defendant's right to confrontation, the same must be
true of an incompetent child's hearsay.
If the prosecution has strong corroboration of the abuse,
there is little need for hearsay. If, however, the evidence is
inconclusive, the state may need the hearsay to prove its case.
When the state's case is weak, the defendant is most vulnerable
to the dangers posed by the hearsay and in greater need of his
confrontation rights. Thus, the greater the threat to the defen-
dant's rights, the more likely the prosecution will be to use the
Act to admit the hearsay. The result will be to use the Act
mainly in instances where it will tend to undermine a defen-
dant's right to confrontation.
In a Connecticut case, State v. Segerberg'7 2 the prosecution
argued that there would be no conviction if they could not intro-
duce the hearsay declaration of an eight year-old abuse victim
69. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
70. WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.44.120(2)(b) (Supp. 1983).
71. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, at § 1420.
72. 131 Conn. 546, 41 A.2d 101 (1945).
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after the court had found her incompetent. The Connecticut
Supreme Court held that it was fundamental that the state
prove its charge by proper evidence. Inadequate proof could
not be allowed to open the door to improper evidence. Sexual
abuse had to be proven by confrontation of witnesses and the
safeguards of cross-examination." ' The Act does precisely what
the Segerberg court refused to allow, since it permits admission
of evidence that could never come into court through the testi-
mony of the declarant.
V. CONCLUSION
A Washington case currently under appeal, State v. Ryan,7
demonstrates the problems that are certain to arise as courts
begin to apply the Act. Apparently, the prosecutor informed the
court that the children were incompetent to testify.7' There was
no hearing conducted by the court to determine competency.
The defendant admitted that the children were incompetent,
but argued that they were not unavailable." The court rejected
this argument and admitted the hearsay.78 This case is undoubt-
edly the first of many in which a defendant is forced to rebut
the statement of an incompetent child whom he has had no
opportunity to observe or cross-examine.
Sexual violence against children is a horrendous crime and a
severe social problem. The Act may result in more convictions,
but it greatly enhances the risk of convicting innocent people. It
is essential that the defendant's constitutional rights, including
those guaranteed by the confrontation clause, are respected. The
horror with which society reacts toward the act of child abuse
73. Id. at 550-51, 41 A.2d at 103.
74. Id. at 552, 41 A.2d at 104.
75. No. 5530-111-2 (Wash. Ct. App., Div. III, 1983).
76. Telephone interview with John G. Burchard, Jr., defense attorney (Sept. 1983).
According to appellants, the children were four and five years old. Brief for Appellant at
5, State v. Ryan, No. 5530-111-2 (Wash. Ct. App., Div. III, 1983). Apparently the judge,
prosecutor, and defense attorney all assumed the children were therefore incompetent.
However, James Lobsenz, an attorney formerly with the King County Prosecutor's Sex-
ual Assault Unit, told this author that children as young as three have been found com-
petent to testify. Interview with James Lobsenz in Seattle, Washington (Aug. 31, 1983).
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should not result in a conviction based on emotion rather than
fact.
Katrin E. Frank
